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INDUCEMENT FOR EXPLORATION BY COMPANIES 
Richard Young* 
It is nice to be here again. I do think that I should make clear 
that I am not an industry spokesman. I have no authority to speak 
for the industry. I have no clients who are engaged in these activi-
ties, and I am not privy to special industry knowledge on this sub-
ject. 
When Roger Hull and Fred Goldie had certain difficulties with 
the program, and Marne Dubs and others could not attend, I agreed 
to say something about the industry's position. However, I have not 
really prepared a full, detailed statement, and consequently, you 
will be listening to some adlibbing. The opinions expressed here are 
not necessarily my own. In fact, I feel like the young barrister years 
ago who appeared before Lord Chief Justice Elenborough defending 
some character accused of committing a crime. The barrister de-
cided that his only chance was to throw himself and his client on 
the mercy of the court. So, in addressing the Lord Chief Justice, he 
kept referring to "this unfortunate man," and "my poor client." 
This went on until the Lord Chief Justice interrupted, and said, "Go 
on, sir. Go on. The court is with you so far." The industry might 
feel that way about my representation of them. 
I think I might first raise the question: what do we mean when 
we say "industry"? Until recently, there was no "industry", but the 
technology of deep seabed mining, which is the genie out of the 
bottle, has made one possible. Until very recently, no one ever wor-
ried about the mineral resources of the deep seabed. The technology 
has been largely developed by American companies, although im-
portant work has been done in Japan. The American mineral com-
panies have been the leaders in opening this field. Still, they have 
found it desirable, for reasons I will get to in a moment, to enlist 
additional support and backing overseas. Thus, I suppose that when 
we speak of "industry" today, we are speaking of the several major 
consortia of private companies• which are seriously interested in 
* Member New York bar. 
1. Presently, there are six active consortia according to a November 1977 Interior Depart-
ment report, comprised of the following organizations: 
1. Kennecott Copper Corp. (50 percent interest): 
Rio Tinto Zinc (10 percent); 
Mitsubishi Corp. (10 percent); 
Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd. (10 percent); 
Nornada Mines (10 percent); and 
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deep seabed mining. 
First, there is the consortium headed by Kennecott Copper 
Corporation which is supported by Rio Tinto Zinc, Mitsubishi, and 
others.The second consortium is headed by U.S. Steel, and a large 
share is also held by Union Miniere. Their operating arm is Deepsea 
BP Minerals (10 percent). 
2. Ocean Mining Associates (OMA) (90 percent interest); 
U.S. Steel Corp. (33 percent); 
Union Miniere (Belgium) (33 percent); 
Sun Oil Co. (33 percent) [respective percentages of OMA]; and 
Other interests (10 percent) including Deepsea Ventures, Inc., which provides engi-
neering and management services. 
3. INCO Consortium: 
International Nickel Co. (25 percent); 
AMR Group (Metallgesellschaft; Preussag, and Salzgitter) (Germany) (25 percent); 
Deep Ocean Mining, Co. (DOMC); a consortium within the consortium comprised 
of 23 Japanese companies headed by Sumitomo. Lippon Mining, Dowa Mining and 
others (25 percent); and 
Sedco (25 percent). 
4. Lockheed Missile & Space Corp.: 
Billiton International Metals (Royal Dutch Shell, The Hague); 
Amoco Minerals Division of Standard Oil of Indiana; and Bos Kalis Westminister 
Grove, the Netherlands. 
5. French Group (AFERNOD): 
Centre National pour l'Exploitation des Oceans (CNEXO); 
Commissariat L'Energie Atomique (CEA); 
Society Metallurgique Pour Le Nickel (SMN); 
France Dunkerque (Empain Schneider Group); 
Bureau Recherches Geologique et Minieres (BRGM); and Pechiney (expected to join 
soon). 
6. CLB group: 
CNEXO; 
Soceity Le Nickel (SLN)/SMN; 
CEA: 




International Nickel Co.; 
Sumitomo; 
AMR; 




Superior Oil Corp.; 
Broken Hill Pty; 
Phelps Dodge; 
Furutaka; and 
Ocean Resources Inc. 
S. REP. No. 1125, 95th Cong.2d Sess. 35, 36 (1978). 
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Ventures, Inc., which was ably, if controversially, advised by Profes-
sor Goldie. A third consortium is headed by International Nickel 
Company, which is associated with German interests and with 
Sedco, an American company which is one of the leading firms in 
the offshore drilling business. · Fourth is the consortium headed by 
Lockheed which has interests held by Shell and others, and which 
is now the proud charterer and operator of Howard Hughes' mystery 
ship, the Glomar Explorer. 
The existence of these consortia reflects the very high risks and 
uncertainty of deep sea mining. There are risks of all kinds technol-
ogical, economic, and others. Furthermore, the existence of these 
consortia reflects the need for huge amounts of capital. Deep sea 
mining is a very expensive business as well as a very risky one. I do 
not suppose anyone, at least they do not say so publicly knows 
exactly what investment in deep sea mining may eventually amount 
to when, and if, it goes ahead. There are figures available in the 
public domain, based on a study done at M.I.T., which indicate 
that, for a typical ocean mining project which would handle perhaps 
three million tons of nodules a year, the costs would approximate 
the following estimates: the original exploration and the research 
and development work-$25 to $50 million; the capital invest-
ment-$350 to $650 million; and, the operating costs-$120 to $160 
million. These figures are probably a couple of years old. Although 
an inflation factor was built into them, I think one could safely 
assume that the costs are probably even greater today. 
To give you an idea of how the income side of the ledger might 
look, estimates for the value of the important recoverable minerals, 
such as copper, nickel, and cobalt, vary between $100 and $200 per 
ton of nodules. Not long ago, Marne Dubs estimated $100 per ton. 
The M.I.T. study thought the figure was closer to $200 per ton. The 
value depends in large measure on the market prices for these met-
. als. As George Aldrich just said, these prices have been relatively 
depressed in recent months, but seem to be picking up now. 
So much for the industry and the costs. Considering the high 
risks and the amount of money involved, one might ask why anyone 
would want to make this kind of investment, especially when one 
reads that the land-based supplies of these metals seem to be more 
than adequate for immediate future needs. In fact, not long ago, 
that very point was made by the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
when he pointed out how large world reserves of these metals were 
when compared with current world consumption. The Assistant 
Secretary of Defense did not seem to think that deep sea mining was 
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a very urgent undertaking at all. This may be true with respect to 
the total volume of available resources, but two additional factors 
should be considered. 
The first factor, which was also mentioned by George Aldrich 
earlier, is that we may well need these sea-based sources of minerals 
when we get into the first quarter of the twenty-first century. When 
you stop to think about it, that is not all that far away. 
The second factor is that, although there may be a great deal 
of copper, cobalt, or nickel around, these resources are very often 
located in places which, at least from the American or Western 
point of view, are rather unsatisfactory. For example, Zaire, as you 
know, had some trouble in its mining area a year or so ago. As a 
result, the price of cobalt rose sharply. The United States imports 
ninety-eight percent of its cobalt from Zaire. Clearly, there are very 
important considerations involved in developing alternative sources 
of supply. 
There are several reasons why industry might be interested in 
the seabed as a source for these metals. First, industry may be 
interested in a seabed source for these minerals because it is a po-
tentially reliable, steady, and stable source, free from problems such 
as those in Zaire and Iran. A second reason, and a very understand-
able one in a private enterprise society, is that industry may see an 
opportunity for profitable investment in a new industry, with at 
least some promise of economic reward. That, after all, is what they 
are in business for. Yet another potential reason for industry interest 
in seabed mining is that the various companies in the industry are 
concerned about maintaining their relative market positions. 
Hence, when they see their competitors going info deep sea mining, 
they feel a need to stake out an area of operation in that field as a 
kind of hedge, a defensive move. 
So much for why industry might want to go into deep sea min-
ing. What does the industry need to induce it to make this kind of 
investment? This question is very closely related to the points that 
I have just made. Obviously, the industry needs security for its 
operations. This means a right to exclusive operations in a particu-
lar area. This has always been one of the theoretical . pro bl.ems in 
customary international law. Of course, one can go out and take 
nodules, as Professor Goldie was saying, but there is nothing to 
prevent Company X from any country from coming up beside you 
and removing nodules as well, after you have spent large sums of 
money locating the bed. I know that there may be technical flaws 
in that argument, but it aptly conveys the legal situation. Thus, 
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industry needs exclusivity-security against intrusion by competi-
tors, hijackers, or whomever. 
In addition, industry needs assurance that it will not be dispos-
sessed by whatever regime is in force. This is vital when industry 
approaches a banking institution and requests $100 million to 
dredge nodules from the South Pacific. The bank will inquire as to 
what kind of assurance of security the industry can give. This is a 
very obvious economic requirement that industry must meet. 
Obviously, industry also needs an opportunity to make at least 
a reasonable profit. I will not go into the question of what is reasona-
ble at the moment. However, when undertaking a high risk venture, 
one usually expects a good return, or else the investment is not 
worth the risk. 
Protection from harassment is also very important to the indus-
try. It needs protection from unfair or unequal competition. That is 
one of industry's great concerns with a parallel system of private 
enterprise on one track and international enterprise on the other. 
The industry is concerned that international enterprise will have 
unfair advantages in terms of taxes, leverage, and favored treatment 
by the Seabed Authority. These are genuine concerns for a business 
venture. 
Further, the industry needs assurance that the financial bur-
dens upon it, the imposition of royalties or other payments, will not 
be too great. It needs assurance that the financial burdens it will 
have to assume will be reasonably related to what the business can 
realistically bear. This has been an area of disagreement and contro-
versy, although Ambassador Koh has striven manfully to try to 
bring the two sides together. 
Another very difficult point involves the rules governing the 
transfer of technology. The Informal Composite Negotiating Text2 
(ICNT) and its annexes impose very demanding requirements on 
private industry with respect to the transfer of technology to public 
international enterprise. I do not think the industry would be averse 
to transfers of technology on reasonable commercial terms that 
would assure rewards for its inventiveness. However, industry is 
greatly concerned about the mandatory transfer of technology, both 
in principle and as a matter of feasibility. There are very difficult 
practical problems. For example, if a subcontractor who has his own 
2. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, (6th Sess.) Informal Compos-
ite Negotiations Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/W P.10 2nd Add. 1. 
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technology is working for you out in the deep seabed, what are his 
obligations to transfer his technology? Conversely, what are your 
obligations if he refuses to do so? What are the potential sanctions 
against you? Problems of this kind abound. 
Finally, the industry needs effective provisions for what you 
might call the rule of law. It needs meaningful dispute settlement 
arrangements. You can see from what I have been saying that dis-
putes are bound to arise concerning the transfer of technology, 
financial arrangements, or unfair competition (not to mention pric-
ing and market arrangements which I have not discussed). 
At the conference, Professor Sohn strove to put together an 
extraordinarily complex system for dispute settlement which is 
most ingenious. In fact, it reminds me a little of Rube Goldberg's 
machines. Nevertheless, it is certainly the most magnificent effort 
for international adjudication and also for adjudication of the rights 
of private operators yet undertaken. The industry is not yet sure, 
however, that this system is good enough. Therefore, it is open to 
question. 
If the requirements I have mentioned, which industry sees as 
essential, were met, or even substantially met, in an international 
regime, the industry would not be opposed to an international 
treaty. In fact, it would prefer an international regime to any other 
potential alternative. An international regime must be acceptable, 
and that is where a lot of difficulties arise. Unless the difficulties 
which industry perceives can be resolved in a satisfactory way, the 
treaty will be unacceptable. 
I think the industry feels that it has tried very hard to meet the 
other side more than half-way. It has agreed to accept a parallel 
system, although it really does not like the idea very much. It has 
essentially agreed to live with the so-called banking system in which 
applying for a license for a particular area requires the submission 
of two areas to the seabed authority, one for the applicant and one 
which the authority is entitled to keep for itself. In effect, this dou-
bles the research and exploration costs. Nevertheless, the industry 
is willing to accept this if it can get some of the other concessions 
mentioned earlier. 
The industry, in the enthusiastic fashion of American compa-
nies, has been plowing money into this area for ten years now, and 
wants to get on with it. Businessmen get tired of continually invest-
ing and never seeing any return on their investment. Since the con-
ference has dragged on and on with no end in sight, pressure has 
built up for national legislation. This national legislation would be 
6
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 6, No. 2 [1979], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol6/iss2/4
1978-79] Inducement For Exploration 205 
an umbrella over the industry's operations. Such legislation might 
eventually develop into a reciprocal system of parallel national leg-
islation. For example, Germans might recognize American rights, 
and Americans in turn would recognize German rights. Currently, I 
think the industry sees national legislation as one alternative. How-
ever, if the conference cannot satisfactorily resolve the issues before 
it, national legislation may become the only alternative. Therefore, 
the industry is pressing for legislation both as an alternative in event 
the conference fails, and as a method of putting pressure on the 
conference to get on with the business of reaching a satisfactory 
resolution. 
The industry does not object, I believe, to the provisions which 
state that if legislation is passed, it will be superseded if a treaty 
emerges which the United States can accept. Industry does have two 
concerns in this respect. First, it would like to include a grandfather 
clause so that any investments made under national legislation 
would not be jeopardized by the advent of the international regime 
under the treaty. Second, industry would also like, although it 
seems unlikely that it will succeed, to include some kind of govern-
ment insurance against loss of its current investment if deep sea 
mining was to prove impossible, either because of the international 
climate or because of the regime that will ultimately emerge. 
In sum, I can say that the industry's concern is with certain 
requirements which it feels are essential. If all or most of these 
requirements are met, industry would prefer an international re-
gime. The important thing is to get on with the job. It takes a long 
lead time to get into production in this kind of operation. In light 
of this long lead time, if we start operations now, there will be a need 
for these minerals by the time they are extracted from the sea. 
7
Young: Inducement for Exploration
Published by SURFACE, 1979
206 Syr. J. Int'l. L. & Com. [Vol. 6:199 
PANEL DISCUSSION 
CONGRESSMAN McCLOSKEY: Mr. Young, in view of the action 
of the House last year enacting a deep seabed mining bill but de-
clining to give financial guarantees to the mining companies, can 
you candidly say that the passage of the bill in that form would be 
a sufficient guarantee against financial loss so that the companies 
would go ahead under the so-called "umbrella" of such a bill? 
MR. YouNG: I should make it very clear that I have no special 
company knowledge that would enable me to answer that other than 
as a private citizen. My own feeling, and that is all it is, is that a 
bill in the form of last year's legislation would probably suffice for 
at least some of the companies to go ahead. The companies pursue 
different strategies and have different standards of evaluation. 
Therefore, I think it possible that not all of them would move. 
CONGRESSMAN McCLOSKEY: In your opening comment, you re-
ferred to reasons which had caused major companies to go abroad 
to enter into consortia with companies from foreign countries. 
Would you please elaborate on why individual American companies 
like Lockheed, Kennecott and others seek broad foreign participa-
tion in their consortia? 
MR. YouNG: Here again it is clearly my own observation. I think 
the major concerns are financial. The capital demands are so large 
and the uncertainties are so great that this is essentially a way to 
spread the risk among a number of strong capital holding countries. 
A subsidiary reason, I suppose, is that the more people you get in 
bed with you the more you have on your side, not only in this 
country but in other countries as well. That may have been a factor 
too. 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: In that connection, if a subsidiary 
reason was to achieve legitimacy, or at least to reduce the threat of 
opposition from other countries that might have navies, resources, 
or incentives to prevent U.S. companies from unilaterally mining, 
do you suppose that, if such a law were enacted, a U.S. company 
interested in deep seabed operations in the South Pacific, for exam-
ple, might want to join a consortium with investors who are parti-
cipants from the countries in the Pacific basin that might present 
a threat to the successful operation of these mining ventures? 
MR. YOUNG: This is a .variant of your theory of the sail boat 
blockade. 
CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY: I keep saying that I do not think it 
is a theory. I think it is a practical event that is almost sure to 
follow. I can tell you that on the California coast the young Califor-
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nians who want to protect whales probably outnumber the lawyers 
who discuss these matters. The enthusiasm and idealism of their 
position far outweighs the desire of members of our military estab-
lishment who might have to fight to defend these operations. 
MR. YouNG: Yes, I like whales too, and so I have a great deal 
of sympathy with this. However, I do not believe we should get into 
that particular question again. The question you asked about par-
ticipation is one that is a problem for multinational corporations in 
many areas of activity. I suppose all I can say on that, if I under-
stood your question correctly, is that I certainly favor as much par-
ticipation as possible in all places. 
MR. HERMAN: May I address a couple of comments to you? You 
have the somewhat unenviable task of trying to speak for industry. 
I think you have admirably qualified your position very carefully, 
and rightfully so, because it is a bit misleading to say that industry 
has "a view" as such. There are different companies that have dif-
ferent views. I would like to point out that, as a matter of fact, one 
major company involved in international consortia efforts to de-
velop technology to mine the seabed is INCO, a Canadian company. 
In fact, it is the largest existing land-based producer of nickel, and 
it ships most of that nickel to the United States. I am sure that when 
you were talking about the need for security of supply because of 
the unsatisfactory suppliers, you inadvertently failed to indicate 
that Canada was not one of those potential areas of insecurity. 
MR. YouNG: I might just say on that point that I certainly agree 
with our authorities that Canada is stable. Nickel is not one of the 
strategic materials that are stockpiled in the United States, primar-
ily because Canada is our largest source of supply and is believed 
to be reliable. 
MR. HERMAN: It is a pleasure to hear that reaffirmation, and I 
think it is fair to say that the widely held view in the United States 
is that Canada will continue to supply the U.S. with its nickel needs 
well into the next century. This raises the very point that I made 
at the outset, that industry has different views on this subject. 
INCO, for example, in its testimony before the U.S. Congress, took 
a slightly different view from some of the testimony that was given 
by U.S. corporations. INCO said that it saw the seabed as a source 
of nickel supply that would gradually become increasingly signifi-
cant in the future. I have to be careful here because I do not want 
to misrepresent what INCO said. You have to look at the testimony, 
but, as I recall, the statement made on behalf of INCO was that it 
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saw the seabed as gradually coming on strong as a source of supply 
in the next century. 
I might add, just as a preface, that INCO is one of the few 
consortia, if not the only one, that has developed the technology 
that seems workable in lifting and gathering the nodules from the 
seabed. However, because of current supply demand situations, it 
has put current development plans on the back burner as it stated 
publicly last April. 
One point I want to make here is that we have to be careful 
about overexaggerating the immediacy of the need for seabed min-
ing. I think that one of the problems, at least from my point of view, 
is that there has been some rush or push on the part of certain 
industry spokesmen to try to instill in the negotiators at the Law of 
the Sea Conference a sense of urgency because the industry was 
faced with immediate problems. I do not believe the problems are 
that immediate. Perhaps you might comment on that. 
The other point I want to make is that when you talk about 
a capital cost of the magnitude of $650 million per operation (I 
have heard figures that go as high as a billion dollars) and when you 
look at the nature of the operations and the fact that the technology 
is unproven, it strikes me that it is going to be difficult for any 
company to get that kind of money from a bank. Even under a very 
secure regime it is going to be hard to get that kind of financing from 
a bank. I do not know where the money is going to come from. It 
will be hard to get that out of the cash flow. I suppose that some of 
these companies might try to raise it through some means of equity 
financing. However, you talk about a billion dollar investment in a 
new, unproven venture, and you compare the costs of developing 
land-based mines and smelters which would be much lower in terms 
of total capital costs and in terms of total cost of nickel per pound 
produced, I just cannot see how, in the near or medium term, that 
kind of money will be available. I appreciate that industry is inter-
ested in having a secure regime under which to operate in order to 
get that money. Even with a secure regime, it strikes me that we 
are talking about an awful lot of money, and I wonder if that money 
is going to be widely available. 
A final point which you might wish to comment on is whether 
legislation passed by a national legislature, which may provide some 
form of licensing and some guarantee of national protection for li-
censes, will provide the adequate political, if not legal, security that 
these companies need. This gets back to what we were talking about 
earlier. If there is going to be major political dislocation as a result 
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of unilateral legislation, what value will it have for a company in 
the long term? Those are my questions, for the time being. 
MR. YouNG: Well, those are good questions. I hope that some 
of the others on the panel will address them too. I certainly should 
make it clear that industry is not monolithic in its position. There 
are considerable individual divergencies. It is quite true that Inter-
national Nickel has perhaps diverged more than any of the others 
from a common line, for its own very good reasons. One reason is 
that it is the largest landbased nickel producer, and it is all set to 
mine nickel on land. Therefore, it has no need to hurry on anything 
else. 
As for the question of financing, I am simply not competent to 
speak on the subject. I do not know enough about what discussions 
the industry may have had with the banks, or about what it has 
done as far as looking into the capital markets. It is interesting to 
note, as Fred Goldie has just reminded me, that in both Germany 
and Japan there are government subsidies available for developing 
this kind of operation. This is an additional reason for getting Ger-
man and Japanese partners involved. So there is some possibility 
for that kind of financing. Everything that Mr. Herman said about 
the difficulty in raising capital is, I suspect true. I think my only 
answer would be that this sort of thing has been true of many new 
industries and technologies in the past. Why should I give that 
fellow Henry Ford any money with that crazy motor car? 
MR. HERMAN: He probably only wanted about $100, not a bil-
lion. 
MR. YOUNG: I would like to think that there is more venture 
capital available. On the question of economic return on invest-
ment, at what level does it become economic to produce seabed 
minerals given various market conditions? That has been the sub-
ject of great research and argument. A famous M.I.T. model, which 
took account of thirty-two variables in projecting this picture, came 
out, as I recall, with the kind of conclusion you would expect: 
given certain conditions, seabed mining would be profitable. Ab-
sent those conditions it would not be. 
Lastly on national legislation, I assume that political questions 
would arise out of the adoption of national legislation. I am not sure 
how really serious these would be. I think this becomes a question 
of how one evaluates the political scene in the international arena. 
There again, you can get a wide divergence of views. 
MR. HULL: Assuming the inducements are there for industry, 
and assuming the legislature in its infinite wisdom, puts these in-
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ducements in the form of a bill which will pass both Houses this 
year-the question which then arises is the "hypothetical" that 
Congressman McCloskey raised. If one looks to the history of this 
country (the most recent example was the tuna problem with Ecua-
dor), when there is not agreement with other countries vis-ii-vis 
legislation or the views we may have with respect to a world prob-
lem, then at times the U.S. seems to back off. Thus, if we have a 
situation where the New Zealanders or others come out to challenge 
Deepsea Ventures of Kennecott, or any other company which may 
be engaged in deep seabed mining, the question arises: what would 
the State Depart~ent, or the Defense Department, or the U.S. gov-
ernment in general do? 
MR. YouNG: Industry would like to know too. 
MR. ALDRICH: I would like to make a comment on the earlier 
point which is easier to handle than Roger's. 
CONGRESSMAN McCLOSKEY: Might I intervene, Mr. 
Ambassador? With all due respect, I think that the question might 
be: what would the Congress permit the State Department to do 
under those circumstances which could lead to war? I phrase the 
question this way, because the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution enabled 
us to get into a major war without a declaration of war. This left an 
indelible impression on the Congress, which vowed never again to 
permit a President to get us into war through his State Department, 
unless Congress votes to declare war. I merely add that because I 
think that recently the State Department is learning, to its dismay, 
that it can no longer guide the President unless Congress will sup-
port it. Angola is the most recent example of that. 
MR. HULL: I think that the situation here may be reversed in 
that, historically, it has been the State Department that has refused 
to enforce the claims. It has been the Congress, with respect to the 
tuna question and it would be Congress with respect to the mining 
question, that would be pushing the issue: and it would be the State 
Department that would be holding the reins. 
AMBASSADOR ALDRICH: It may be indiscreet for the representa-
tive of the Government to talk about the industry, but for twenty 
years I have been trying to prove that Lincoln succeeded in diplo-
macy through candor rather than discretion, so I am not about to 
stop now. It is my impression that there are considerable differences 
among the countries whose companies are involved in these consor-
tia. You find, particularly in Japan and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, real interest in subsidizing the effort. Both of those coun-
tries, of course, do not have a Canada sitting next to them. Both of 
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them feel a much more urgent strategic need for access to additional 
metals than does the United States. Perhaps both of them have 
more of a tradition of a close, financially intertwined relationship 
between their governments and their private concerns. 
The American companies involved have very prestigious 
names, Lockheed, Amoco, and Sedco. The International Nickel 
Company is partly American but it is largely a Canadian company. 
What we are talking about when we refer to the seabed mining 
companies are the tiniest, thinnest slivers of these corporate giants. 
They are a handful of people working on a new research and devel-
opment project. When you visit one of these companies, you get the 
impression that the people who represent the seabed mining indus-
ti}r are only one of fifty or one hundred research development pro-
jects that these giant companies have going, most of which will 
never see the light of day. What these companies have going for 
them is primarily the inevitability of seabed mining. Everybody 
knows that eventually it is going to happen, and that it will be 
important and profitable. The problem is that nobody knows when. 
Therefore, in trying to get boards of directors of the parent 
companies to give them money to keep their technicians together 
(and this is really what they are, a handful of technicians) the 
seabed mining companies have to show that there is some possibil-
ity that the parent company is going to get a return on that invest-
ment in the not too distant future. For that purpose legislation in 
the United States is very important. At the present time, with the 
Law of the Sea Conference completing its seventh full session with-
out any solid draft treaty as far as seabed mining is concerned, the 
seabed mining companies have nothing to point to when they have 
arguments with the board of directors about why the parent com-
pany should put more money into this "foolish" project. I can well 
imagine the boards of directors saying that seabed mining is some-
thing for the next century, that there is no point in keeping it up 
now, so why put more money into it? The creation of a framework, 
even under national legislation, is important when these companies 
make decisions to keep their ventures going. 
Now from a national point of view, we have a certain interest 
in ensuring that, where the U.S. has a technological lead in this 
industry, it does not fritter it away. Therefore, there is a national 
interest, in giving these companies some inducement to continue 
their exploration, research, and moderate investment in this field. 
There is not enough of a national interest, I would suspect either in 
the view of the executive branch or the Congress, to spend taxpay-
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ers' money to do that. As long as we do not have to do that, perhaps 
the creation of some kind of a framework will help keep these invest-
ments alive and thus keep American technology at the fore of an 
industry which will be a major world industry in the future. 
Somebody mentioned the point about borrowing. I have the 
distinct impression that none of the companies involved in the law 
of the sea expect that they can get what would be called project 
financing from any bank for their first projects before the technology 
and economics for such projects have been proven. I do not think 
they can get a dime on the basis of seabed mining. However, they 
can borrow on the good name and credit worthiness of Lockheed, 
Sedco, International Nickel Company, etc. Even though they can 
borrow money, they are free to borrow it for any use they might want 
to make of it, without regard to securing it for the prospects of 
seabed mining. 
Finally I would note that in the long term, I suspect that the 
companies that have investigated this most carefully and that have 
the best, most experienced international advice would say that they 
would never expect to be able to conduct commercial operations 
solely on the basis of U.S. national legislation. This is an interim 
kind of thing to keep them going-to keep them alive. They antici-
pate a treaty, an international regime. Hopefully, one will come out 
of the Third United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea. If that 
fails, then some other international regime would have to be con-
structed. 
I would also note that my predecessor in my present job, Dick 
Darmay, wrote an article in Foreign Affairs last year pointing to one 
possibility for an alternative regime. It would involve a treaty con-
cluded among potentially interested mining states and open tooth-
ers, including developing countries. I think we should not dramatize 
legislation as the sole, ultimate alternative to the Law of the Sea 
Treaty. Rather, it is merely a way station. Thank you. 
MR. HULL: I think that at this point we will take a very brief 
coffee break. When we return, Roy Lee will speak on the developing 
countries' viewpoint and Congressman McCloskey will give a con-
gressional viewpoint on deep seabed mining. 
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